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Are All the Good Men Married?
Uncovering the Sources of the Marital Wage Premium
By KATE ANTONOVICS

AND

A longstanding and yet unsettled question in
labor economics is: Does marriage cause men’s
wages to rise? Cross-sectional wage studies
consistently find that married men earn higher
wages than do men who are not currently married.
Even after controlling for a broad set of covariates, this estimated differential is large, ranging
from 10 to 50 percent. Among the competing
explanations for the marital wage premium,
three receive the most attention. The first is that
marriage makes men more productive by allowing them to specialize in non-household production. The second is that employers discriminate
in favor of married men, and the third is that the
unobservable characteristics that make men
more productive in the labor market also make
them more attractive in the marriage market.
The primary difference between the first two
explanations and the third is that the first two
suggest that the marriage has a causal effect on
men’s wages, while the third implies that the
estimated marital wage premium is the result of
an omitted-variable bias. This paper attempts to
identify the causal effect of marital status on
earnings by using data on monozygotic (MZ)
twins to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Data on monozygotic twins have most frequently been used to obtain estimates of the
returns to schooling (e.g., Orley Ashenfelter and
Alan Kruger, 1994; Jere Behrman et al., 1996).
These studies control for differences in genetic
endowments and family background by examining the relationship between within-twin variation in schooling and wages. In a similar
fashion, we use within-twin variation in marital
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status, to examine the effect of marriage on
men’s wages.1 We find that, when the data are
treated as a cross section, the estimated marital
wage premium is 19 percent. When we look
within MZ twins, the estimated premium does
not fall. In fact, the point estimate increases to
approximately 26 percent. These results are robust to alternative specifications of the wage
equation and various attempts to control for
measurement error. Thus, the findings indicate
that little, if any, of the marital wage premium is
due to the selection of more productive men into
marriage.
Previous studies of the marital wage premium, have attempted to control for unobservable heterogeneity by using panel data to
difference out individual-level fixed effects
(e.g., Sanders Korenman and David Neumark,
1991; Eng Seng Loh, 1996; Christopher Cornwell
and Peter Rupert, 1997; Jeffrey Gray, 1997;
Leslie Stratton, 2002). Estimates from these
studies vary considerably. While some authors
report that the marital wage premium disappears
once individual-level fixed effects have been
controlled for, others report that the marital
wage premium remains positive and significant.
There are numerous potential problems with
these fixed-effects estimates. First, these estimates are likely to be biased if past earnings
shocks affect current marital status. For example, if men are more likely to get married after
receiving a positive wage shock, then fixedeffects estimates of the causal effect of marriage

1

A common criticism of twin-studies estimates of the
returns to schooling is that they may exacerbate the biases
caused by unobserved heterogeneity since there are likely to
be unobservable differences even between identical twins,
and it is difficult to imagine what, besides those unobservable differences, would lead twins to choose different levels
of education. Our study may be less open to this criticism
since there is arguably a larger random component to marital status. See John Bound and Gary Solon (1999) for a
complete discussion of the biases associated with twinbased estimation.

* Antonovics: Department of Economics, University of
California–San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA
92103; Town: School of Public Health, Health Services
Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, 516 Delaware St., S.E., 15-200 PWB, Minneapolis, MN 55455. We
thank Jere Behrman and Mark Rosenzweig for our data,
Andrea Beller, Eli Berman, and Julie Hotchkiss for their
helpful comments, and Jennifer Poole for her excellent
research assistance.
317

318

AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

on wages are likely to be biased downward due
to regression to the mean.2 In addition, fixedeffects estimates will also be biased if unobserved productivity is time-varying. For
example, fixed-effects estimates of the marital
wage premium will be biased upward if men
postpone marriage until increases in their unobserved productivity lead to higher wages.
Only one other paper, Harry Krashinsky
(2004), uses twin data to study the impact of
marriage on wages. As in Ashenfelter and
Krueger (1994), his data were collected from
the Twinsburg Twins Festival. Krashinsky’s
cross-sectional results imply that married male
twins earn 23 percent more than unmarried
twins. However, the within-twin estimates drop
the returns to marriage to 6 percent, but the
standard errors are large (7.7 percent), and thus
it is difficult to infer much about the causal
relationship between wages and marriage from
his study.
I. Empirical Framework

We assume that wij , the logarithm of wages
for individual i 僆 {1, 2} from family j is given
by
(1)

w ij ⫽ ␤ M ij ⫹ ␥X ij ⫹ ij ⫹ fj ⫹ uij
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interpreted as the causal effect of marriage on
wages.
For an MZ twin pair, equation (1) can be
rewritten as
(2)

w 1j ⫽ ␤ M 1j ⫹ ␥X 1j ⫹ 1j ⫹ fj ⫹ u1j

(3)

w 2j ⫽ ␤ M 2j ⫹ ␥X 2j ⫹ 2j ⫹ fj ⫹ u2j .

The principal identifying assumption in our
analysis is that, for MZ twins, 1j ⫽ 2j. That
is, we assume that the genetically determined,
individual-specific earnings endowment is identical across twins. Given this assumption it is
possible to difference equations (2) and (3) so
that
(4) w 1j ⫺ w 2j ⫽ ␤ 共M 1j ⫺ M 2j 兲
⫹ ␥共X1j ⫺ X2j 兲 ⫹ 共u1j ⫺ u2j 兲.
Differencing equations (2) and (3) sweeps out
individual-specific and family-specific earnings
endowments. As a result, the least-squares estimate of equation (4) produces an unbiased estimate of ␤. If the estimates of ␤ from equations
(1) and (4) are similar, then this suggests that
marital status is unrelated to unobserved
productivity.

where Mij takes on the value of 1 if the man is
married and 0 otherwise, Xij is a vector of
control variables including age, experience and
years of schooling, ij is an individual-specific,
genetically determined earnings endowment, fj
is a family-specific earnings endowment, and uij
is a mean-zero independently and identically
distributed error term. It is assumed that ij , fj ,
and uij are unobservable to the econometrician.
The parameter of interest in this study is ␤,
the marginal impact of marriage on wages. If
more-productive men select into marriage, then
Mij will be positively correlated with either ij
or fj (or both) and the ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimate of ␤ will be biased upward. A
major goal of this and other studies of the marital wage premium is to eliminate this selection
bias so that the resulting estimate of ␤ can be

Our data come from the Socioeconomic Survey of Twins.3 This survey was sent to a subset
of twins from the Minnesota Twins Registry
(MTR). The MTR is the largest birth-recordbased twin registry in the United States and
comprises about 80 percent of the approximately 10,400 surviving intact twin pairs born
in Minnesota from 1936 through 1955. Between
1983 and 1990, the MTR staff was able to
locate both members of about 80 percent of the
surviving pairs and sent them a four-page bibliographic questionnaire (BQ). Then, between
May and November of 1994, the Socioeconomic Survey of Twins was sent to the members of the pairs who had filled out the BQ and
for whom the MTR still had a current address.

2
See Joshua Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a full
discussion.

3
See Behrman et al. (1996) for further discussion of the
data.

II. Data Description
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In total, data are available from both members of
487 male twin pairs, of which 280 pairs are MZ.
Our analysis focuses solely on these MZ pairs.
Our indicator of marital status is current
marital status.4 It takes on a value of 1 if the
individual is currently married and 0 otherwise. Our measure of schooling is constructed
using the respondents’ report of their highest
completed degree. From these reports we construct four indicator variables for whether an
individual has less than a high-school degree,
a high-school degree but no college degree, a
college degree but no postgraduate degree, or
a postgraduate degree. The other right-handside variables include tenure at current job
and region-of-the-country dummy variables.
For the cross-sectional analysis we also include age and age-squared as additional control variables.
We restrict our sample in a number of ways.
First, we consider only individuals who work at
least 26 weeks per year and at least 20 hours per
week. In addition, we drop observations in
which individuals earn above $60/hour (less
than 6 percent of the sample) or below $4.25/
hour (the Federal minimum wage in 1994). We
also drop a small number of observations in
which individuals report working more than
100 hours per week. For two individuals who
indicate that they worked more than 52 weeks
per year, we code them as having worked 52
weeks. Observations with missing data are
dropped. We lose 116 twin pairs due to missing
values and an additional 28 twin pairs due to our
sample-selection criteria. Cleaning the data
leaves us with 136 MZ twin pairs. The twins in
31 (23 percent) of these pairs differ in their
marital status.
In order to determine whether our sample is
representative of the U.S. population, Table
1 compares the means of various demographic
and job-tenure variables for the twins in our
sample to those of a similarly selected cohort of
men in the 1995 March supplement of the Current Population Survey. The CPS sample is similar to our sample of twins with regard to
average age, weeks worked per year, hours

4

We also explored including an indicator for divorced
and widowed, and the results are not qualitatively different
from those we report here.
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TABLE 1—COMPARISON OF MINNESOTA TWIN SAMPLE
AND THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
Twins sample
Variable
Hourly wage
Age in years
Weeks worked
per year
Hours worked
per week
Less than high
school
High school
College
More than
college
Tenure
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
N:

CPS

Unmarried Married Unmarried Married
17.2
(10.3)
45.3
(5.2)
51.0
(2.5)
44.6
(11.0)
0

82.9
(38.1)
2.4
(15.6)
14.6
(35.7)

21.5
(10.4)
47.5
(5.2)
50.5
(4.0)
46.0
(9.5)
0.9
(9.3)
53.7
(50.0)
25.1
(43.5)
20.3
(40.3)
14.6
(9.8)
0.4
(6.6)
86.6
(34.2)
4.3
(20.4)
8.7
(28.2)

41

231

63.4
(48.8)
19.5
(40.1)
17.1
(38.1)
11.7
(9.3)
0

15.2

18.8

46.0

47.1

49.8

50.7

43.3

45.5

12.1

9.9

59.6

54.8

18.2

20.0

10.0

15.4

—

—

18.7

20.5

22.2

24.1

33.9

34.4

25.1

20.9

3,736

13,862

worked per week, and percentage married. In
addition, consistent with previous studies, we
find that unmarried men earn less, are younger,
are less educated, and have lower job tenure
than their married counterparts.
III. Results

The first column of Table 2 presents the
cross-sectional regression results of the logarithm of wages on the marriage indicator and
our other explanatory variables. The coefficient
on marital status is 0.19 (t statistic ⫽ 1.98).
Thus, in the cross section, married men earn a
19-percent higher wage than unmarried men,
controlling for other characteristics. In line with
other cross-sectional work on the returns to
schooling, the parameter estimates also indicate
wages increase with education (e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).
The second column of Table 2 reports the
within-twin coefficient estimates of the return to
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TABLE 2—REGRESSION OF LOGARITHM
ON MARITAL STATUS

Variable
Currently married
High school
College
More than college
Age
Age-squared
Tenure
Tenure-squared
Midwest
South
West
N:
R2:

OF

WAGES

Cross
section

Within
MZ twins

0.19*
(0.096)
0.49
(0.25)
0.85**
(0.26)
0.85**
(0.27)
0.10
(0.10)
⫺0.00087
(0.0011)
0.011
(0.011)
⫺0.00030
(0.00034)
0.083
(0.081)
0.17
(0.16)
0.12
(0.12)

0.26**
(0.098)
0.15
(0.40)
0.21
(0.42)
0.25
(0.42)
—

0.017
(0.014)
⫺0.00045
(0.00043)
0.51
(0.55)
0.22
(0.57)
0.31
(0.57)

272
0.20

136
0.10

—

* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.

marriage. The coefficients indicate that men
who are married earn 26 percent more than
unmarried men (t statistic ⫽ 2.69). Furthermore, under the assumption that within-twin
differences in marital status are exogenous, then
the 26-percent increase in wages associated
with marriage has a causal interpretation. The
estimated returns to education are positive but
substantially smaller than the OLS estimates.
Since, these education coefficients are imprecisely estimated, we cannot infer much about
the returns to education.
A well-known problem with first-differencing equations (2) and (3) is that doing so tends
to exacerbate the biases caused by measurement error, especially if the right-hand-side
variables are highly correlated within twins (Zvi
Griliches, 1979). Fortunately, marital status can
be inferred from two separate questions in the
survey. In only two cases does the respondent
give conflicting answers, and our results do not
change when we drop these individuals from
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our analysis. In addition, we have estimated ␤
both in the cross section and within twin pairs
using each twin’s report of the other’s schooling as an instrument (here education is treated
as a continuous variable) using a strategy suggested by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994). The
results are very similar to the non-instrumentalvariables estimates.
It is noteworthy that the implied marital wage
premium from the within-twin-pairs regression
is similar in magnitude to the cross-sectional
estimate, suggesting that men are not selecting
into marriage based on unobserved heterogeneity in earnings capacity. Thus, we find no evidence that the observed marital wage premium
arises due to the selection of more productive
men into marriage. In addition, the estimated
coefficient on marital status remains above 0.21
when wage at first full-time job, wife’s full-time
work experience, or number of children is included in our analysis.
IV. Conclusion

In this paper, we examine why married men
earn more than men who are not currently married. We use data on monozygotic twins to
distinguish between the selection hypothesis
(that more productive men are more likely to
marry) and the hypothesis that marriage causes
men’s wages to rise. Our results provide little
support for the selection hypothesis. Even
within MZ twins, the marital wage premium
remains large, and the point estimate is on par
with that from cross-sectional regressions.
Thus, the answer to the question posed in the
title of our paper, appears to be “no.” Not all the
good men are married. Rather, our results suggest that marriage causes men’s wages to rise.
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